

Growing in Contemporary: A Crisis Inside the Crisis

Humberto Moacir de Oliveira* and **Bruno Curcino Hanke**

Master of Science, Postgraduate in Psychology, The Federal University of Minas Gerais (UFMG), Belo Horizonte, Brazil

***Corresponding Author:** Humberto Moacir de Oliveira, Master of Science, Postgraduate in Psychology, The Federal University of Minas Gerais (UFMG), Belo Horizonte, Brazil.

Received: December 02, 2019; **Published:** December 27, 2019

Abstract

Adolescent in contemporary: a crisis within the crisis. Psychoanalysis has long demonstrated the crises that mark the contemporary world. The halting place of the father, the inconsistency of the Other and the imperative of enjoyment are trademarks of today's capitalist discourse. Given this scenario, another crisis is gaining ground in discussions of clinical and society. This refers to the experience of puberty and the series of responses that come together around what is called the crisis of adolescence. In order to collaborate with the discussion of the adolescent in contemporary society, this article aims to identify the specificities of puberty and the historical moment in which we live.

Keywords: *Adolescence; Puberty; Contemporary; Psychoanalysis*

Introduction

Talking about adolescence in contemporary times requires some very exciting challenges for the psychoanalyst. The main one may be to think about the possible psychoanalytic reading of adolescence, since the object of study and treatment of psychoanalysis is the subject of the unconscious, presented early on by Freud as an ageless subject. Another challenge of the theme is to highlight what would be the effects of contemporariness on the psychic apparatus, again taking into account the relationship of the contemporary Other with the subject of the unconscious. Finally, the great challenge seems to be to address the issue of adolescence in contemporary times.

It is true to the epistemology of psychoanalysis, which has as its ethics the ethics of the subject of the unconscious, therefore, a subject without predicates.

Once this is done, it will be necessary to understand the dynamics of the contemporary world, highlighting the decline of the father figure and the transformations of super egoic requirements as aspects that make the experience of adolescence subjectivation even more difficult. For if the father's imago, as a representative of the law and organizer of the norms, helped the adolescent to find some answer to the questions posed by puberty (even though some of these answers sought to counter or attack the father), these answers nowadays they rely less and less on their father's help, which explains the rise in symptoms that signal separation from the Other, such as drug addiction, suicide, or depression. Coupled with this declining aspect of the paternal imago, the super egoic figure of our time, who demands the enjoyment of consumption, also brings difficulties to this process of subjectivation of adolescence, since it favours, as a response to puberty, the offering of the body over any ideal; which at other times may have helped to modulate the enjoyment that contemporary symptoms so exacerbate.

Both aspects must be treated with great caution, so as not to overvalue adolescence, for example, to approach delinquency, or to fall into nostalgia, believing that at other times, adolescence was much quieter. We cannot, in psychoanalysis, treat these issues with value judgments. It is not the case of judging whether our age is worse or better than the others, nor whether the teenager is more or less annoying than a child or an adult. For psychoanalysis, it is only necessary to perceive the specificities of both the historical moment and the constitutional moment of the subject, from which to think about their clinical work inside and/or outside the office. It is in search of these specificities that the present work goes.

Adolescence, symptom of puberty

The title of this subitem makes direct reference to the article of the same name by the psychoanalyst Alexandre Stevens (2004). In his text, as the title itself denounces, Stevens makes clear his choice to treat puberty as a more fundamental and pertinent term for psychoanalysis than Adolescence, which is a response to puberty. For the author, adolescence is “a sociological term that, under a supposed biological basis, has become of psychological use” ([1], p. 27). Also in Freud’s work we find a predilection for the term puberty and almost no reference to adolescence.

But before addressing the distinction and relationship between puberty and adolescence, we must first define what psychoanalysis attempts to embrace with these terms, since it is incompatible with the Freudian idea that we propose that these names account for a period of human development that ceases with the arrival of adulthood. Several times Freud has shown that the unconscious cannot be apprehended in terms of chronological age. From his studies of the dream to the end of his work, Freud never tired of comparing the unconscious with the functioning of the infantile psyche or primitive peoples. This shows that even when Freud speaks of a phase of human development, whatever it may be, he is not referring to a natural event predicted to conclude. On the contrary, what Freud always pointed out was that one of the main difficulties of the psychic apparatus is to abandon one model of functioning for the benefit of another. This indicates that there is always an unsurpassed remnant in the human psyche that goes with the advancement of years. A rest from childhood, yes, but why not say a rest from adolescence as well?

This makes the sense of chronological age falter in psychoanalysis. An adult may have the same fears as a child, and by attending to an elderly person, the psychoanalyst may find the same fantasies that the subject had in his teens. In this sense, the subject, as apprehended in psychoanalysis, has no age. The subject is neither a body that, over the years, undergoes phylogenetically programmed natural mutations nor the social representation that the years computed in its identity card prove. To be more precise, Freud’s subject is between the drive, which has a body source but is not a body, and the representation, which comes from the field of the Other but is never fully grasped by it.

Lacan well defined this condition of the subject by writing it with the barred S ($\$$). If the S in the Lacanian work represents the signifier, the bar represents the lack. The subject would then be a signifier that escapes the signifier chain; and thus escapes any representation. For, being the subject represented by a signifier and having the signifier its value in the difference that it sustains in relation to other signifiers of the chain, the subject will always be in this interval, being neither the signifier representing it (S1) nor the signifier that makes a difference (S2). That is, for Lacan, the subject is always what is between one signifier and the other, and can never be fully represented by any of them: “The subject is nothing else - whether or not he is aware of what signifier he is - but what slips in a chain of signifiers” ([2], p. 68). Therefore, the subject, by definition, escapes the objective identifications of the social bond, including the identifications related to his age.

However, this does not imply that psychoanalysis disregards the times of the subject, nor that the psychoanalyst does not see the effects that social representations and identifications have on the unconscious. Thus, we can think, as the Argentine psychoanalyst Alba Flesler [3] warns, that if the subject is not old, he has times. Although the idea of logical time is developed by Lacan [4], something similar but not identical can also be found in Freud in his interpretation of human sexuality. Freud [5], in distinguishing, in his essays on sexuality, an infantile organization followed by a period of latency and, later, puberty, seems less to fix phases of development to be fulfilled

chronologically than times of the constitution of sexuality. Each of these times (the moment of seeing the first sexual awakening, the time to comprehend the latency period, and the moment of concluding puberty), although necessary to think the logic of the constitution of human sexuality, are not empirical facts capable of being related chronologically and immediately to the subject's life, so they do not have a precise moment of predetermined beginning and end.

It is in this light that puberty comes to Freud's penalty. For the Viennese psychoanalyst, puberty represented, before any phase or chronological age, the time after the latency period. If, in the period prior to latency, Freud denounced the first awakening of sexuality, latency would be the moment when this sexuality that arose in the early years of life would fall asleep. Needless to say, Freud argued that this falling asleep of sexuality in the period of latency does not represent an annulment of its effects, but a cooling at all. And it is in the period of latency that Freud assumes to initiate the main impacts of culture on the subject: repression, sublimation, character formation, fantasy, and the first symptomatic arrangements. Puberty then appears as the moment in which a second awakening of sexuality occurs, just after this period of cooling or supposed falling asleep.

Not by chance, it will be around the theatricalization of this awakening of sexuality that will turn one of the few Lacanian references on the subject of adolescence. By prefacing Wedekind's *The Awakening of the First* [6], Lacan [7] highlights this dimension of the awakening of sexuality, saying that sexuality is meaningless, it punctures the real. The occurrence of the awakening of the adolescent characters of the play is, for Lacan, an encounter with the real, especially with the real of sex. Real here, in the Lacanian sense of the term, while what lacks symbolization or image. Really, as Stevens [1] points out, it cannot be summed up by the hormonal increase that requires the expulsion of sexual fluids, which causes no relevant crisis in other animals. The real here must be understood mainly as the failure of the symbolic and the imaginary. For if the first awakening of sexuality came from a time of latency in which the subject found, albeit precariously or fantastically, a symbolic and imaginary arrangement for his partial drives or for his polymorphous perversion, then puberty is the moment when This arrangement fails.

The field of the Other marked by Lacan [8] as a treasury of signifiers, as well as the figure of the father, who as representative of the law orders this symbolic field by denouncing the lack of the Other plays a fundamental role in the latency period. By reviving Oedipus, as warned by Freud [9], puberty demands the re-actualization of choices made in early childhood and latency; both object and position choices regarding sexualization. By re-actualizing these choices, the subject realizes that he can no longer count on the Other, nor on the father, nor on the childhood fantasies and not even on the image of his own body that is in abundant metamorphosis. Imaginary and Symbolic fail; The real appears.

This is the main idea defended here to talk about puberty: puberty is the moment of encounter with the real because the Other, treasure of the signifier and therefore also provider of meaning, fails, as well as fantasy, the father and the other. IDs. In this context, the subject questions the senses of the world, appeals to and attacks his parents, experiences severe identity crises, moves on, rivals older generations, seeks out-of-home identifications, experiences the ambiguities of object choices and position towards sexuality. But all that appears as pictures of what the media call the teenage crisis are responses to puberty, at least if we understand puberty as a moment of encounter with the real. It is in this sense that adolescence presents itself as a series of symptomatic responses to the encounter with the real promoted by puberty.

This whole formulation meets the psychoanalysis proposal of thinking the symptom always as a response to what Lacan [2] called non-sexual relation. Miller and Laurent (2005) recall well that when Lacan refers to the inexistence of sexual intercourse, it is the drive that is involved. To say that there is no sexual relation is to say that the drive finds in the Other's field no accommodation possible or commensurate with its demand. What Lacan denounces, of course, is not that there is no sexual act, but that there is a disjunction between the drive and the Other's field, even when the sexual act happens. The drive is foreign to the Other as it seeks in the Other the object of its satisfaction. We know from Freud that this object is forever lost, that is, the subject does not find this object in the Other -

neither in the body of his partner, nor in the language of his country, nor in the culture of his world. Puberty, by provoking the awakening of sexuality again, demanding the re-actualization of sexual choices, places the adolescent in the face of this impossibility of finding a destiny for his drive in the Other's field, which includes the small other, that is, his similar, but also all the culture, the world you live in. The biological theory of animal instincts makes us suppose that among animals there is a know-how to do with sexuality that does not exist among humans. As Stevens [1] points out, human beings lack real knowledge about what complements the sexes. In the absence of this knowledge in the real, the subject seeks knowledge in the Other. But this knowledge fails, and it is this failure of knowledge that the adolescent responds to.

However, we can never assume that this encounter with the lack of knowing in the real is something exclusive of adolescence. And here it may be worth asking the same question that Freud [11] asked himself when studying the melancholy. In the face of the complaints of the melancholy who reproach themselves for being worthless, vile, or the meaninglessness of their lives, Freud wonders why these people can only see these truths after their illness? What Freud reveals is that we are all vile and that everyone's life is meaningless, but the melancholy stop at this, while others prefer not to deal with it. The teenager also seems to carry this sometimes melancholy indignation with the arrangements and senses of the world. In a recent visit to Brazil, Pope Francis said in a report that he does not like a young man who does not speak up. How much the Holy Father really wants a revolution is something we can very much question, but he denounces a relationship between youth and revolutionary change that is worth listening to. The young man nicknamed "annoying" by the media is exactly the one who is indignant with the knowledge of the other, who questions the knowledge of his parents and who, confronting old generations, causes both family annoyances and the most important transformations of a country.

Here it is worth a little more detailed reflection, so that we do not agree too quickly with the caricature of the teenager presented by the media. To say that the encounter with the impossibility of sexual intercourse, the failure of the Other, and the task of detaching oneself from the parents are events that mark puberty, cannot mean that the answers will always be confrontation with the Other or revolutionary. It must be understood that the symptoms in psychoanalysis are always unique. And the answers to this encounter with the real will also be very diverse, whether they please the Pope or not. As much as the media or parents see the symptoms of defiance of the Other as a nuisance or greater possibility of change, we must be careful not to consider this kind of symptom more serious just because it is more disruptive or transformative to world order. Often the symptomatic response occupies exactly the opposite place, of trying to recover in the Other the supposed completeness of the knowledge lost with the encounter with the real. Young people who engage in an even greater alienation in the field of the Other, precisely because they do not want to believe in the real for which they have been awakened. In this situation, we find young people who are dedicated to their studies trying desperately to recover the knowledge that has been revealed to them insufficient or trying to fulfill all the impossible demands of the Other, from the standard of body beauty to the excessive consumption ordered by the media. These are the young people whom the Pope said he did not like, although for a long time the Church fought exactly to make them all like these young people. The fact that these symptoms of alienation in the Other's field are supposed to cause less noise in the family and less changes in society should not be considered as a sign of less seriousness of the symptom. The cases of teenagers who languish to have the body supposedly demanded by the media show us that alienation in the Other is not necessarily a better way out than to oppose it.

However, to this picture of symptomatic responses in which we have so far highlighted the search for confrontation with the Other and the alienation to the same Other we can add an answer that is more serious than the others because it is a separation much more radical from the Other field than all of the above. I refer here to what Lacan [12] called the Passage to the Act. Faced with the failure of fantasy, the subject may choose to jump out of the significant chain, separating it radically, as happens in suicidal acts. This is the case of Moritz, one of the main characters of *The Awakening of the Primeval*. Their parents place in their school education the hope of a better future for the whole family. Moritz tries at all costs to comply with this requirement by alienating himself at the desire of his parents. But in the face of his failure he leaps out of the Other's field, even if it sacrifices his own existence for that. Sonia Alberti [13], for whom Moritz is

a psychotic, clearly highlights the difference between Wedekind's character suicide and other suicide attempts that, while serious, seek to send a message to the Other. This is the case of Dora, who writes a note to her parents foreshadowing a possible suicide attempt that does not even occur. In Moritz, there is no message, there is a leap out of the desire of the parents and, finally, of the significant chain itself.

Anyway, the symptoms are many and should always be treated on a case by case basis. However, it is still possible to outline some series of responses ranging from confrontation with the Other (through indiscipline, delinquency, revolution, generational conflict) to alienation from the Other (through stress, anxiety, obsession with study, consumption, beauty sacrifices); beyond the possibility of attempting radical separation from the Other (through the act, suicide or homicide). Other sets of symptoms might be thought of, but for the moment let us dwell on saying that all these responses of alienation, separation, and confrontation (which is still an attempt at separation, perhaps an alienated attempt at separation) do the same. problem: the encounter, at puberty, with the impossibility of sexual intercourse, with the disjunction between the drive and the Other or, in other words, with the real.

The other contemporary

Having highlighted the challenges that the experience of puberty imposes on the adolescent subjectivation process, and some series of possible responses to these challenges, it is time to think about the specifics that our historical moment presents in this time of awakening to the real. Again, we find some challenges that the ethics of psychoanalysis imposes on us, because it is necessary, rather than doing a sociological analysis of how the contemporary world works (which in itself would require a great effort), to think about how this functioning of the current world focuses on the subject of the unconscious. In *Group Psychology and The Analysis of the Ego*, Freud [14] had already highlighted the reciprocal influence that exists between the subject and the world around him. The psychoanalyst says, for example, that there is no reasons for radically contrasting 'individual psychology' and 'social psychology', since a group study cannot neglect the fact that every human group is formed by a meeting of people, just as an individual analysis You should not neglect the fact that every human being suffers from the relations he has with other human beings and with the world around him.

Lacan [8] will bring this subject's relationship closer to what is otherness to him when he proposes, as one of the names of the unconscious, the Other. Therefore, in Lacan, the presence of the unconscious is in the place of the Other as a treasure of the signifier, the deposit of the material that the subject receives from what is foreign or external. The subject itself, as seen above, is now defined by Lacan as the effect of this Other, since the signifier that represents him for another signifier comes from this field.

Thus, in psychoanalysis, subject and Other merge in a way that we can affirm that everything external to the subject is also quite belonging to him. The relationship we have here is similar to what Lacan [12] stressed happened in Moebius's band, where a peculiarly twisted tape coincides two surfaces, thus blending the interior and exterior and breaking with the logic of sphere topology where there is a clear separation between the inner and outer surfaces. Thus, the subject is not immune to the events of the word that represents it, the body that pulsates in it, the world that surrounds it, the politics that commands it, the science that defines it and the whole culture that affects and produces it. However, the place of the Other remains the same: home of the signifiers that articulate themselves in chains while suffering and causing effects of and in the real. The Other's place always remains the place where the subject directs his questions. However, because it is home to signifiers, it is alive as we can say that language is alive, that is, it is in constant modification and construction, undergoing changes that affect the dominant discourses of culture and influence the ways of the subject to stand before the language. castration, desire, sex, law and anguish. In other words, the subject does not exist without the Other and the Other extends to culture. That is why we cannot look at adolescence in Freud's Vienna, Wedekind's Germany, or in today's globalized world. The world has changed since Freud's time, and psychoanalysis must be able to grasp these changes so that it remains alive. It is time, then, to emphasize what are the main specificities of our time that affect the experience of adolescence.

There are many changes that have occurred since the invention of psychoanalysis to the present day, and psychoanalytic theory itself has collaborated with some of them, while many others have contributed to the advance of psychoanalysis.

Freud sometimes risked some guesswork for what the world would be like after him. We can use some of these Freudian predictions to understand the changes that have taken place in contemporary society. This is the case of the suggestion given to the readers of his day to expect from the future world an awakening to science that surpassed religion, to the point where the latter failed. It is a fact that we are far from witnessing the failure of religion, as Lacan [15] pointed out in one of his interviews in Rome. However, the place that Freud reserved for science in the future does not seem so wrong. Betting on a correlation between phylogenesis and ontogenesis, Freud [16] believed that every human being repeated the progress of civilization, which made him equate infantile thinking with the psychic mode of functioning of primitive peoples and suggest a progressive development. From humanity from an animistic to a scientific worldview, passing in this interval a religious worldview. Thus, the very time in which Freud lived would already have a scientific worldview awakened mainly by Descartes and Galileo, considered by Lacan [17] the parents of modern science. According to Freud, this scientific view of the world would be in the process of overcoming the religious view. Confirming the Freudian hypothesis, and despite the important place religion still occupies in the world, science has advanced to almost replace the religious God (the almighty father) with the “god” of reason. If there was a time when all contingency was attributed to God’s will, today God shares a place with scientific explanations when not surpassed by them.

Finally, reason swept away his father’s omnipotence. This is demonstrated within the family itself, where it is increasingly common for parents to seek help in science, psychology, pedagogy or even statistics to educate their children. Very early on, Lacan came close to this, and in the late 1930s he even claimed that “a large number of psychological effects seem to us to stem from a social decline of the paternal imago. A decline conditioned by turning against the individual some extreme effects of social progress” [18]. Since then, not only has the father of religion become questionable and flawed, but the very image of the father as a regulator of jouissance and legislator of norms has taken on a claudifying, flawed, evasive aspect. The great substitute figures of the father, such as teachers, rulers, or employers, were gradually losing their authority while this authority was being distributed in a dispersed way in scientific knowledge. It is increasingly common for a ruler, even the president of a country, to reveal his lack of knowledge by denouncing the amount of variables on which his government depends. These variables are accounted for by the knowledge of science. Similarly, a teacher is increasingly questioned in the classroom from information gathered momentarily from the internet, a direct product of technological science. The boss is accused of bullying and fears lawsuits that could harm him. In companies, it is possible to see a substitution of the word boss for the word leader, indicating that the occupant of the position in question is not an exception that enjoys all the privileges and does what he wants, but a flawed human being willing to participate in the process. Building ideas and tasks; finally, much closer to an older brother than to a father. This is what psychoanalysis means by declining paternity, and Stevens [1] is right to say that it is not up to the psychoanalyst to say whether this is better or worse, or to propose a return to his father’s virility. It is up to the psychoanalyst to understand his time and update his clinic without departing from his ethics.

Associated with the decline of fatherhood, we find another effect of scientific progress that also seems to present new challenges to today’s adolescent subject. The technological achievements achieved by science have allowed capitalism to undergo some significant changes. The philosopher Vladimir Safatle [19] draws attention to a modification that occurs in the superego himself, a psychic instance formulated by Freud to account precisely for the introjection of the values of an epoch into the human psyche. For Safatle, although the scientific view of the world was somewhat present in Freud’s time, the production society persisted in feeding the suppressive superhero typical of the religious view. Using Max Weber’s sociology, Safatle reveals to us that the hallmark of capitalism as a production society was not the enjoyment of goods and services as we find it today, but rather the accumulation of capital by those who: “(...) they derive nothing from their wealth for themselves except the irrational feeling that they have ‘properly’ fulfilled their task” [19]. The accumulation of capital demands a renunciation, and the production society is then marked by a strict superego that prizes for the renunciation of jouissance, or, even more precisely, a superego that demands a joy in renunciation and accumulation; therefore a joy in the ideal.

With the advancement of science, which enabled a huge technological development and, in turn, a considerable increase in productivity, it was possible that more subjects were far from the direct link with the production process. A larger field has opened up for the tertiary

sector, which concerns goods and services. This expansion of the consumption of goods and services meant that the emphasis on the accumulation of money and the enjoyment of the ideal of ownership began to fall on the expenditure, consumption and enjoyment of objects offered by science and technology. The everyday example we have of this turnaround of accumulation and production for enjoyment and consumption is the credit card. With credit card, *jouissance* comes before the accumulation of capital, and also before the instinctual renunciation demanded by the "Freudian superego". For Safatle, this new figure of the superego, which could be called the "Lacanian superego", is less linked to the repression of the drive motions than to the assumption of ghosts: "No more repression of *jouissance*, but *jouissance* as imperative. This is why he [Lacan] reminds us that the true imperative of the superego in contemporary times is: "Enjoy!" enjoyment transformed into an obligation" [19].

The problem with this change in the process of socialization, which entails an imperative of *jouissance* rather than renunciation, is that this order ("Enjoy!") Cannot be satisfied. The superego didn't lessen his pressure or his folly, he just changed his demand. If, before, your requirement was "not satisfied", which was equally impossible, since the subject was satisfied with the symptom, now he orders the enjoyment, but says nothing about how to enjoy. Or rather, it says in so many ways that it is the same as not saying.

From the discussions of Miller and Laurent [10] on the same theme, we can say that the Freudian superego is a mark of a time when the ideal was greater than the enjoyment ($I > a$). This means that the circuit of enjoyment passed through the social Other which, through the ideals of the time, modulated satisfaction. This is what Weber points out when he says that the man of the production society took nothing from his wealth to himself except the sense of accomplishment (the ideal of the time). Today we live in a time when the ideal is less than *jouissance* ($I < a$), which means that the contemporary *jouissance* mode is no longer organized by the ideal and functions in a status that Miller and Laurent call autism.

Grow in contemporary

It is against this backdrop of falling fatherhood and a superhero who commands *jouissance* beyond any ideal that young people today must experience their puberty. If one of the puberty tasks we can extract from the Freudian text is to detach from our father, we may even wonder if contemporary society itself is not invited to a similar task. In Freud's proposal that phylogenetic and ontogenetic development coincide, we can say that primitive peoples are as close to the child psyche as contemporary society is to adolescence. Crisis of the paternal imago, crisis of ideals, crisis of the Other, in short, much of what we claim to characterize adolescence also characterizes the world in which we currently live.

What these analyzes of the contemporary world reveal to us is that the adolescent can now count even less on the Other. Freud [20], writing about the psychology of the student in a text that addresses his own youth, says that he spent the whole period of the gym sketching in a low voice the task that would be proposed in the future. At the end of his studies, he was able to transpose this task to paper, writing in a dissertation his desire to bequeath some contribution to human knowledge. For Hugo Freda [21], the task to which Freud refers is the inscription of a wish in the field of the Other. Freda assigns this task to every adolescent, because to detach himself from the influence of his parents is to some extent seek this inscription beyond the home. For the author, there is a big distinction between child-to-adult identification, for example, by wanting to exercise the other's professional activity (being a police officer like an uncle, a lawyer like a father, a doctor like a grandfather, etc.) and a woman. inscription of one's own desire in the field of the Other, a task more typically adolescent than childish.

If the contemporary Other is as weak as we have proposed above, or even if it does not exist, as Miller and Laurent [10] even suggest, then the adolescent's task becomes even more complicated. There was a time when adolescents, disconnected from their parents' influences, found an offer of exception groups with whom they sought to identify outside the home. Punks, hippies, rockers were names that held a more or less solid representative value that young people sometimes clung to for the rest of their lives. Today, values continue to be offered, but with such a large dispersion and such an absurd speed that the young man no longer seems to be deluded into them.

The cry of Frejat and Cazuzá's [22] music in the late 1980s gives an idea of what young people would live with ever more intensely. After saying that her heroes died of an overdose, Cazuzá cries, "Ideology, I want one to live for".

For Miller [23] what has changed is that, previously, the subjects received the representative value (the master signifier, S1) from the Other field and, currently, according to the author, the subjects elaborate their own S1, without evaluation. from the other. For Safatle, this is a disconnection between the imperative of jouissance and the privileged normative contents in society, which is quite typical of the Lacanian concept of superego that says "Goze!", But does not indicate the norm, i.e. demands enjoyment anyway - or anyway: "Subjects are no longer called upon to identify with ideal types built on fixed and determined identities, which would require engagement and a certain ethic of belief" [19]. The contemporary teenager is lost between the superegoic order of jouissance and the metamorphic abundance of jouissance, which fixes no S1, as Miller would say, no ideology, as Cazuzá would say, no ideal type, as Safatle would say. Even because the liquidity and fleetingness of these modes of enjoyment is an essential part of today's capitalist discourse. This is the task of today's adolescent, and perhaps not only adolescent: to live their crises within the crises facing their world [24-26].

Final Considerations

Adolescence today is adolescence without the ideology claimed by Cauza in 1988. It is adolescence in the face of a widespread crisis of the father figure, adolescence with the difficult task of inscribing its desire in the field of an increasingly failing Other. This implies changes in the psychoanalytic clinic of these young people. It is becoming increasingly common for adolescents to maintain an autistic relationship with their electronic devices, or who seek a enjoyment that is supposed to do without the other, as in drug addiction, or an absolute refusal to demand the Other to eat, such as in cases of anorexia. It is up to psychoanalysis to reinvent itself in these cases and to do what Freud has always done well: to learn from the symptoms of his day to elaborate on their practice and theory, making research and treatment coincide. It is the invitation and the challenge that today's teenagers send us.

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Volume 9 Issue 1 January 2020

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