Abstract

In the centenary of the publication of Introduction to Narcissism, some discussions are again being considered, to which Freud responded to his colleagues, laying the foundations that would provoke intense effects throughout the clinical and metapsychological building of psychoanalysis. Some of those controversies are still valid today, but with new actors in the psychoanalytic scene of our time and renewed interlocutors. The new psychic action will give rise to the emergence of the self, by its exit from narcissism, which would imply a passage from the condition of object to that of subject. Freud always maintained the distinction between the evolution of the self and the evolution of the libido. Regarding this, the model of “object love” “marks a substantial difference with respect to that of “falling in love”. In the latter there would be too much of the object, but rather of the self, then impoverished by the overturning of that libido in the idealized object. The difference between mourning and melancholy shows this situation more than enough, insofar as the second is not the loss of the object, but the ego, which adds to the subject in the self-reproaches and criticisms of the superego. Thus, a “narcissistic mode of functioning” of the psychic, efferent, ejector apparatus of the stimuli and the object can be described, in the style of the pleasure principle prior to the formulations of 1920 and 1924, which tended to the total discharge. The proposal that theatrically shows the ego equating to the object, is not without the intervention of the superego, as pure cultivation of the death instinct. The work of analysis will have to be necessary to try to recover something more from that primitive state, in which libido in the ego and in the object are not differentiated, in an attempt to become more independent of the delusions of the superego.

Keywords: Punctuations; Narcissism

Introduction

[…] And the pool answered,

‘But I loved Narcissus because,
as he lay on my banks and looked down at me,
in the mirror of his eyes
I saw ever my own beauty mirrored [1]

Oscar Wilde, 1894 [1]

For a long time I took into account the dates, birthdays, onomastics, anniversaries, and other significant dates of my closest loved ones and simultaneously the direct association to the Freudian work, as I began to study it, with history same as my family, with the story of my immigrant grandparents, with the lives of my great-grandparents who are also migrants and present in family stories.
In the generational passage of the Italian celebrations of the onomastics, to the most mixed of the birthdays in Argentina, there was a whole epoch of transition in which the day of the name and of the birthday were celebrated in my family, without necessarily coinciding, although Sometimes this happened. Probably in this line, I find interesting the celebration of the hundred years of the works written by Freud in 1914 [2], which constitute a fundamental nucleus of his theories and the metapsychological corpus for our science and art, and at the same time I am honored by the invitation to participate with this writing in the Magazine. I remember that when I began studying with Jorge Winocur, well over twenty years ago, I was struck by the fact that he referred to Freud’s ideas with the years of production of his works, without mentioning the names of the texts. Which aroused a certain intrigue and at the same time placed me unfailingly at the exact moment of the appearance of ideas in relation to other contexts and to that of the Freudian work itself. Immediately I remembered another Jorge, Borges, whose mother would have died ninety-nine years old, before turning a hundred, and that at the comment of a journalist who said "what a pain Borges, that his mother has not come to meet the One hundred years," he answered and what a striking passion you have for the decimal system!" It was then that I thought about what would be the point of stopping to think about the “Introduction of Narcissism” in one hundred years. A passion for the decimal system? Maybe. Perhaps - and better still - it is an opportunity to remember what was happening in those years of war and creation, in that 1914 when the “great war” began, and Freud, with his children at the front, began a fruitful period in the emergence and development of their ideas, which would constitute the core of its theoretical building. This is also an opportunity to take up some possible articulations with some other Freudian concepts, which continue to generate controversies throughout these hundred years [3].

Controversies in psychoanalysis or a hundred years is nothing

And now a year more into this rare life in which the state of mind is, by the way, the only effective value. Mine hesitates, but as you see, as it says on the coat of arms of our beloved city of Paris: Fluctuat nec sink. Freud a Fließ, 21.09.99 (translation is mine).

One hundred years later, we continue to meet psychoanalysts, to talk about psychoanalysis as at that time, when Freud also published a text that would simultaneously write to narcissism: the “Contribution to the history of the psychoanalytic movement”. Some of those circumstances keep repeating themselves. In the epigraph of this work Freud cites the sentence of the coat of arms of the city of Paris, in Latin Fluctuat nec mergitur [2], to which I am going to refer very briefly, to comment on the importance that this phrase could have for us, with that begins such text.

This phrase, attributed to Saint John Chrysostom [3], is the motto of Paris, and is found on the shield of the city, which contains a ship sailing in a rough sea. It is said that Paris is represented by a ship because the Island of the City (Île de la Cité) has the shape of a boat. Badge and coat of arms have as their origin the Corporation of Bargemen of the Seine River; This powerful guild controlled transportation and trade probably from the Roman era, since to get to the Island of the City had to use boats. Even though over the centuries it became an institution more similar to a municipal government than to a trade organization, the original slogan and coat of arms was preserved, and that is why the Municipality of Paris keeps them to this day.

It is interesting that Freud had already used this quote in two letters to Fließ, some fourteen and fifteen years before. The first one in which it appears is from September 21, 1899 (Cf. No. 215) and the other, from June 9, 1901 (Ibid., 267). In the first, he makes a double allusion to Fließ, which I also find very interesting to comment, since Freud, was at that time in the galley tests of the book of dreams, and tells Fließ that “cannot do without” of him, as a corrector, but above all for his friendship and for being “the representative of the ‘other’”. In this letter he refers to his concern for the book of dreams, his corrections, his notes and also in relation to money. That is where he says that “in this rare life [...] the only effective value is the spirit”. He says that his hesitates, but as it reads on the coat of arms of “our beloved city of Paris, Fluctuat nec mergitur”. Then, referring again to his ups and downs in relation to his mood, for the month of May, a couple of days after his 45th birthday, he says about the celebrations and presents received, that “he had begged to ignore the miserable number medium that is too small for a jubilee and too big for a birthday boy”. Fließ would have sent him a letter of salutations for the birthday, with some criticism of his work. Apparently, there were the sketches of Human Bisexuality, a writing that later led to the publication about four years later of the ‘Three Essays on Sex Theory.’
Returning to 1914, the “Contribution to the history of the psychoanalytic movement” arises from the fluctuations of the nave of psychoanalysis, which he had been observing in his closest collaborators, mainly in Adler and Jung. The disagreements of the first with the views of Freud had reached its peak in 1910 [4], and those of the second in 1913 [5], according to Strachey, and Jones in the famous biography (Cf. Jones, pp. 142 ff.) [6]. Despite these divergences, both continued talking about their theories as “psychoanalytic”. I consider this point significant to rethink, a hundred years later, what we call “psychoanalytic”, and the possibility of asking ourselves what another name would deserve. These are discussions that for many could be unsuccessful, repeated, banal or even perimilated, but I think it is a good opportunity to rethink those convictions that we can have, sustain and transmit psychoanalysts, one hundred years after that “fluctuation” of the psychoanalytic ship in waters certainly different from those of our time, but we can also think, similarly resistances. Both with the “contribution” and with “narcissism”, Freud enunciated fundamental postulates and hypotheses of psychoanalysis, to point out that the theories of Adler and Jung were totally incompatible with those, and to extract the inference of what to call with the same name to these contradictory points of view, it could not but lead to a general confusion. Over time, Adler had started to call his work “individual psychology” and Jung, “analytical psychology” to his. In the “Contribution”, in the first section he takes the period until about 1902, during which he was the only participant, of the psychoanalytic journey; the second section continues the story until around 1910 and in the third section examines the dissenting points of view, first those of Adler and then those of Jung, pointing out the fundamental aspects in which they depart from the findings of psychoanalysis.

In Introduction to Narcissism, composed almost at the same time as the “Contribution”, there are also points of discussion with colleagues, especially to show that the concept of narcissism constitutes an alternative to Jung’s “non-sexual libido” and “male protest” by Adler. In the same way as the clinical history of the Man of the Wolves (1918b), written essentially at the end of 1914, although published with two additional passages, only in 1918, as an empirical refutation to Adler and Jung. There are other refutations to Adler in various parts of the work, perhaps a little more austere than these, however the discussion with Adler, regarding the motivating forces of repression, can be mentioned in the final section of Paste a Child, (1919e) AE, 17, pp. 197 ff. Another severe criticism of Adler is found in conference 34 of the new conferences (Cf. pp. 130-2), after citing his meeting with Georg Brandes and the way in which they appear in him the resistance to admit the ideas regarding the Oedipus complex and in turn the way in which Freud uses them to advance on them, makes a direct reference to that: “the individual psychology of Adler, [...] in the United States, is considered a parallel line with equal rights that our psychoanalysis and it is usually mentioned along with this one. In reality, it has very little to do with psychoanalysis, but due to certain historical circumstances it has a kind of parasitic existence at its expense. To its founder, only what we have said about this group of opponents is applicable only to a limited extent. Already the name is inappropriate, it seems a product of bewilderment”.

It also raises the enthusiastic welcome that the crowd should give to a doctrine that does not admit complications, concepts that are difficult to understand, or unconscious and that also eliminates the problem of sexuality. And he continues: “is that the crowd is itself comfortable, demands a single reason as an explanation, does not thank science for its provisional results, wants to have simple solutions and know how to solve problems”. If one meditates on how much individual psychology satisfies these claims, the memory of a passage by Wallenstein cannot be restrained: “if the idea were not so devilishly judicious, one would be tempted to call it downright idiotic (Schiller, Die Piccolomini, Act II, scene 7)”.

Further on he refers to Jung referring to “an analyst scorning the influence of the personal past and seeking the causation of neurosis only in current motives and in expectations about the future”, as an oversight of the analysis of childhood, with the consequence of increasing “Its didactic influence and directly indicating certain vital goals”. He concludes his disquisition on the subject: “this may be a school of wisdom, but it is not analysis” (p 133).

About taking the ideas and essential principles of psychoanalysis seriously

[...] Philosophers appreciated the unconscious without news
of the phenomena of unconscious psychic activity. [...]  

[...] We have nothing to expect from philosophy:
again we would put ourselves forward scornfully
the inferiority of our object. [...]  
Freud, (1916-17 [1915-17]), p. 88 [7]

In the first section of the "contribution", (pp. 14-5), he makes a reference, regarding a derivation of Chrobak and about "taking ideas seriously", as the difference between an occasional love affair and "a marriage" in order. Regarding this metaphor, Freud in his own theory, and with his own collaborators and colleagues, it could be said that he had a few marriages, with various misfortunes, diverse successes and love affairs that were changing over time. And, returning to the "essential principles", refers that among the factors that by their work were added to the cathartic method and transformed into psychoanalysis, highlights: "the doctrine of repression and resistance, the introduction of sexuality infantile, and the interpretation and use of dreams for the recognition of the unconscious" (pp. 14-5).

Then he states that "the doctrine of repression is the fundamental pillar on which rests the building of psychoanalysis, its most essential piece", being the resistance, which is opposed to analytical work, which pretexts lack of memory to make it fail. And it evokes the use of hypnosis, as the one that "concealed that resistance by force", to situate the actual beginning of the history of psychoanalysis, with the technical innovation of the renunciation of hypnosis (p. 15).

Freud clearly notes that the unconscious activity of the soul is the property of psychoanalysis and distinguishes it markedly from what he calls "philosophical speculations about the unconscious" (p. 16). He will return to this point in 1929, situating them -to philosophical speculations- together with religious representations and the formation of the ideal of human beings (see page 93).

I emphasize this point, since today, a hundred years later, a particular fascination can be found in many psychoanalytic circles with respect to philosophy, philosophical commentaries about our science, the tireless search for approval of those who have never even been analyzed, even the sustained attempt of legitimation on the part of these, to avoid in appearance the so-called "splendid isolation" of psychoanalysis and psychoanalysts. I consider it a necessity to be able to continue telling each one of our interlocutors from the different areas of science, art, politics and society in general, the importance of research, therapy and psychoanalytic theorizations. And I think that this is also a policy that psychoanalysis should not abandon, a policy that the pioneers of psychoanalysis in our country, have managed to carry forward with passion and enthusiasm, spreading with commitment and conviction, the ideas of Sigmund Freud and their own, which in turn were developing, even with the risks of mass dissemination, the possible banalizations and accusations, both of their time, as of later times and even the current one, due to the potential superficialization of the concepts so spread. The closeness and rigidity of the psychoanalysts, the difficulty to be interested in those who question us, the hostile exacerbation towards those who manifest their resistance, are a clear Scylla to achieve a possible shipwreck of the ship, as well as an insurmountable Charybdis, may be the deceptive transvestism, which could seem to avoid the conflict of the discussion with the other, by a quick approval, avoiding the encounter with the difference and the need for fruitful discussion, as well as the deepening in our psychoanalytic shibboleth. Such rocks of the Mediterranean, could also be good representations of the "destructive narcissism" [8] that tends with its appearance of arrogance or submission, to the dissolution of the pillars of our science and art.

One hundred years later, we are discussing with the neurosciences, one hundred years later we are again encountering the hypnosis of neurolinguistic programming, self-help books, diagnostic manuals of international legitimacy, religious offers of churches with gods promoted as increasingly efficient, the vacuous speed of two-dimensional technological satisfaction and piece-rate medicament, promoted by powerful international laboratories, which the patients themselves demand in search of a quick relief and in accordance with the era of "greater performance in less time", among others. One hundred years later; it is the analysts themselves who seek a personal analysis less frequently, relieved, quickly and probably lacking in conviction and lacking self-interest. Resistance dwells in each one of us, as does the unconscious itself.

In 1915, Freud states that psychoanalysis is first learned in oneself, noting that this does not coincide with what is called self-observation, but that it involves the study of one’s own personality, since there is a whole series of psychic phenomena that should become the object of analysis in oneself, “via [by which] we obtain the sought conviction about the reality of the processes that psychoanalysis describes” (p. 17).

And in 1923, insists on the conviction in these unconscious psychic processes, the admission of the doctrine of resistance and repression, as well as the appreciation of sexuality and the Oedipus complex, concluding that “this is the main content of psychoanalysis and the bases of its theory, and who cannot admit them all should not be counted among psychoanalysts” (p. 243).

Some points: the “new psychic action”

A first point I will make, is the one that reaches its knot with the much-quoted phrase of Freud, which has this section by epigraph. Curiously, in spite of the similarity of the word that Freud originally uses in German, “Aktion”, with “action” in Spanish, has been translated by some as “act”, and innumerable times repeated of this last form. I understand by action, a greater dynamism, which implies the emergence of the self, in a different way, following the ideas of Jorge Winocur [9], by that exit from narcissism, which would imply a passage from the condition of object, to the condition of subject. But it is not only a matter of translation and formal choice of words, but also some confusion that is common to find, with respect to “I” and “narcissism”, the second being a theory of libido, placement of libido in the I, considered originally as the only object. The interrelationships between these, do not imply for Freud that they are the same. It will then be about the placements of the libido on the one hand and the destinies of the ego on the other. Freud always maintained the distinction between the evolution of the self and the evolution of the libido. Only once did he refer to narcissism as “an early stage of ego development” (1915c, p.126), which in terms of Winocur, can be interpreted as a way of expressing abbreviated, what could have been at an early stage of the development of the libido, and completing the previous sentence, “... during which their sexual impulses are satisfied in an autoerotic way” (p. 230).

When the child is rewarded with recognition and applause for his instinctive renunciations (Garma and Winocur, among others, they would say instinctual), self-esteem increases, producing a gradual learning: that of repression. The internalization of these poor recognitions in exchange for such renunciations is called superego. You can tell me that sublimation is the way out of this crossroads. Probably. But I think it is important to consider that only Freud once refers to it (1910c), as the fate “rarest and most perfect” (seltenste und vollkommenste, AE p.74, Cf. SA, p. 106) for the drive-in This case of research - being that even in that article, a few paragraphs before (p. 70) suggests that the transpositions of the psychic drive force in various ways of doing “may be as impossible to achieve without loss as the physical forces”.

The various libidinal placements mentioned above, will result in various ways of enrichment or impoverishment of the ego and the object, not in a “hydraulic” model alone, according to which the libido that goes from one to the other and vice versa, but with a masochistic intervention of the self that, through narcissism, corresponds rather to the states of the type of “falling in love”, in that there is little of the object, but rather of the self, now enraptured in a masochistic fascination, dazzled before itself and simultaneously impoverished.

There will be in the “object love”, unlike the previous state, a possible mutual enrichment as the libido placed in the ego and the libido placed in the object are not differentiated. Clinically this state is distinguished by not showing any detriment of the self, as it does in the idealizing admiration, typical of the lying promises of paradise that the superego offers in narcissism.

Freud (1882) explains it early, long before the publications to which I have referred up to now, to his beloved “Martita”-Marthchen, in the original (p 299) - that, by its phonetic resemblance to Märchen (the fairy tales), it would seem to show in a condensed way, part of that love: “you should not be stingy with tenderness (fig love) what is disbursed from those funds renews itself through that same expense. If they do not touch [the flow] for a long time, they diminish imperceptibly or the padlock is rusted, then you have it there and cannot use it”(Freud a Martha Bernays, 18.08.1882 [Fischer, page 300, the translation is mine]).
Grief and melancholy: a narcissistic difference. The loss of self and the loss of the object
Alma, if they hurt you so much,
Why do you refuse to forget?
Why do you prefer to mourn what you have lost,
look what you wanted, call what died? [...] 
Alma, do not shut up your window,
in the feverish morning sun,
do not despair, that the most beloved dream
It hurts us the most, it hurts the most.
Manzi, Vélez and Melo (1947)

The first references that Freud makes about melancholy are from 1892-93 (p.155), in which he compares neuroses with that one: in the first one he invites us to suppose a primary presence of a certain "tendency to disquiet", to the reduction of what is translated as "self-consciousness", but that could be said today as "self-esteem". As I pointed out earlier [10,11] the original term, selbstbewuβt/Selbstbewuβtsein is similar in meaning, to which it will reappear twenty-three years later, in Duel and melancholy, as a fundamental difference between these two paintings: das Ichgefühl, literally "the feeling of self" or better expressed, although also a little literal, "feeling of yes".

As in Manuscript E (p.231), in which it deals with the genesis of anguish and in Manuscript G (pp. 239 - 246), which is entitled Melancholy, try in both, to explain it in terms rather than neurological In the first one, it is defined as the product of the accumulation of psychic sexual tension, as a picture that occurs with particular frequency in people who have been "anesthetic" [4] and who, in addition to not presenting any sensation or need for intercourse, show instead, a great longing for love in its psychic form that, when it accumulates and remains unsatisfied, would generate melancholy. Here is the correspondence of the neurosis of anguish: it is worth saying that when physical sexual tension is accumulated the neurosis of anguish would occur and when that is psychic (sexual anguish), the picture would be of melancholy (Cf. P.231).

In Manuscript G (pp. 244 - 5), the idea of "internal hemorrhage" appears, which produces an "impoverishment of excitation, of available stockpiling". It is the foretaste of what he will have to raise in the Introduction of Narcissism. As in the latter, he referred to the different libidinal placements and investitures in the ego, in the object and in the ideal, of the exchanges and reciprocal substitutions between them, this journey shows him in advance as [...] "The ease of Associations [...] grieving". The libidinal impoverishment, is then metaphrased as "an internal hemorrhage" by which there is "an impoverishment of excitement, of available stockpiling", which would manifest itself in the other drives and operations. It poses then to this inhibition as a "withdrawal" that would have the same effect as a wound, analogous to pain. A narcissistic pain? (Cf. p 245).

It is Manuscript N, appended to letter 64, dated in Vienna on May 31, 1897, (p. 296) a genuine predecessor of "Duel and melancholy" (1917e [1915]). In it he will pose ideas that will be drivers of his later thinking, referring to the "melancholy", as the manifestations of mourning manifested in the reproaches that the subject makes to himself, on the occasion of hostile impulses repressed towards the object lost. The self-punishments would then be posed as a confusion between the self and the object, this being a mode of identification, which Freud consigns as "a way of thinking" (Cf. p. 296).

In the Introduction to Narcissism (1914c), the description of the functioning of the "critical instance" (pp. 92-3), which operates in melancholy, already appears. It states that the incitement to form the ideal of the self, "whose trusteeship is entrusted to the moral conscience", is based on the critical influence of the parents, which over time was added to that of the educators and teachers. The institution of moral conscience is thus raised, as an "incarnation of the criticism of parents".

Punctuations on the Introduction of Narcissism, More than One Hundred Years Later

In Duel and melancholy, he develops these ideas thoroughly, being at the same time an extension of the article of narcissism. In the first, he begins by considering grief as a reaction to the loss of a beloved person or an abstraction that takes its place, “like the homeland, freedom, an ideal, etc”. Then he explains the work of mourning, as the piece by piece removal, of the libidinal links with the lost object, of each of the memories and expectations in which the libido was knotted, to be then abandoned (eingestellt, SA III, p. 199), over investors and thus consummating the detachment of the libido [5] (see page 243).

The original term that Freud uses in German for “duel” is Trauer. In that language it has as synonyms the terms Gram -which is pain, sorrow, affliction, grief, as well as figuratively “rottenness” - or Kummer -seekness, worry, affliction, also figuratively “rottenness” - (Could rot also be? of the libido stuck in the self?). Less used is the term Betroffenheit that describes the state of “impact” of a situation; literally betroffen is being “taken”, “touched”, “worried” or “affected” by a situation. The completion heit accounts for the substantiation of that state. Freud chooses the word Trauer. This comes from the verb trauern, which finds its origin in the ninth century. (Kluge, p. 926) in its root of the “middle classical German” -Mittelhochdeutsch- as trüren and in turn in the “ancient classical German” -Althochdeutsch- as truren, which means “lowering the eyes”, as a gesture of retraction and sadness, and in turn, the plastic idea of grief, in “lowering the look, lowering the head” [6]. I find interesting the plastic description of the libidinal retraction, typical of narcissism, which arises from the origin of the word we give in translation by “duel” in Spanish. “Retract the look”, “lower your eyes”, “look away from the object” or perhaps-gradually closing to what we will see after Freud raises “get rid of the object and retract itself” seem to be the ideas that evokes the mere etymology of the Trauer. From this term arises in turn the adjective traurig, of current use, colloquial and everyday, which means “sad”, “hurt” or “sorry”.

Thus he had raised in the narcissism, the movement of libidinal investitures, with the metaphor of the amoeba and its pseudopods, as an original libidinal investiture of the ego, which varies in its placements, being able to go to objects and retreat back to the self. The emanations of this libido, the endowments of the object, can be emitted and withdrawn again, thus signaling the opposition between the ego libido and the object libido (Cf. P. 73).

Narcissistic confusion, as a precondition of melancholy, does not allow us to differentiate precisely what is lost. In the words of Freud, “we can think that the patient cannot capture in his conscience what he has lost [...]” (p.243) In Duel and Melancholy, he raises what I consider to be the distinctive distinguishing features between “duel” and “melancholy”: in the second, unlike the first, what is really lost is a part of the self, according to which there is a reduction of the egoic feeling -two Ichgefühl-. While in mourning, the world has become poor and empty, in melancholy this same thing seems to happen to the self (Cf. Ibid.).

The preconditions that Freud places for melancholy are, on the one hand, a strong fixation on the object of love and, on the other, and in contradiction to it, a low resistance of the object investiture, the latter being chosen on a basis narcissistic (Cf. p 247). This is the way in which Freud himself refers, from an “accurate observation” by Otto Rank.

The already “famous” quote “The shadow of the object fell [then [7]] on the self” [–] (Cf. p 246).I understand it as the fall of a reflection of the object on the self, it is not the object itself, but rather that interception between me and object that corresponds to the narcissistic identification, (Cf. Winocur, 1996) -as Freud explains in the previous sentence- and that prevents the object from being such: it is only its shadow. Thus, the comparison between the ego and the object is expressed, a product of the previous narcissistic condition, which then implies the aforementioned confusion. In the original (SA III, page 203) it is possible to read: “Der Schatten des Objekts fiel so auf das Ich“ [...] So - in German, “then, in this way, that way” - I consider that it is a synthetic reference - as is normally used in that language - to the previous idea: [...] “the free libido was withdrawn on the ego [...] served to establish an identification of the self with the object resigned “[...]. López Ballesteros translated, in my opinion, more closely to the original [...] “The shadow of the object fell like that on the self” [...] (BN 2, page 2095).

As he had introduced with narcissism, he explains that the free libido was not withdrawn to another object, but withdrew over the self, serving this, to "establish an identification of the self with the resigned object”. That the shadow of the object can then fall on the ego then implies that it can be judged "by a particular instance as an object, as the abandoned object”. Hence, the loss of the object is truly a loss of self, "and the conflict between the self and the beloved person, in a bipartition between the critical self and the self-altered by identification” (Cf. Freud, 1917e, pp. 246 - 7).

**Of the narcissistic functioning of the psychic apparatus**

There are various ways in which the subject can defend himself from an external world that represents the objects and the stimuli that come from them. As I started developing some years ago ([12], p.154), following the ideas of Freud, about the encounter of the subject with culture and then ([11], p.163) in relation to narcissism, the most painful suffering would be the one that comes from the bond with others. From the feared outside world, the subject can defend himself by generating technological development, among other inventions, to try to subdue nature to his domain, however his own body and the link with others is not so simple. Seeking to defend itself from suffering, the apparatus tends to the repression of the instinctual representative, which manifests itself in different ways: as the death of the drive, the object detachment, the loss of reality, the repression of autoerotism or the self-resigning its libidinal endowment and abandons itself [13].

The appearance of the critical instance shows the clearest anticipation of what the superego will be (Cf. supra p.10). Starting with the idea of suicide - for which he says that melancholy becomes so "interesting and ... dangerous" - it makes explicit the equalization of the self with the object that makes a key difference with respect to grief. "The analysis of melancholy teaches us that the self can only be killed if, by virtue of the retreat of the endowment of an object, it can treat itself as an object, if it is allowed to direct against itself that hostility that falls on an object and subrogates the original reaction of the ego to objects of the external world [8]” [...] (p. 249).

It is necessary to say that it is necessary that the psychic apparatus has a refractory, narcissistic functioning, tending to expel the stimuli and therefore the object, in the style of the first model of psychic apparatus posed by Freud in the Interpretation of Dreams, as a system filled with quantities, of "efferent" functioning, of which the model of the reflex arc is paradigm, in which a part of the system receives the blow (the stimulus of the object) and triggers the kick immediately (it is disengaged from it), since the system is saturated. In 1900a Freud states that the psychic apparatus that is presented, composed of systems, has a direction, that all psychic activity starts from stimuli (internal or external) and ends in innervations. He concludes then that "[...] the reflex process continues to be the model of every psychic operation [...]” (1900a [1899], pp. 530 - 1).

In the same way he explains this operation in Pulses and destinies of drive (1915c), referring to the initial I-reality, as an instance that has distinguished the inside and the outside and moves into a purified-me-pleasure, which sets the character of the pleasure over any other, tending in this way to get rid of all excitement that, as such, promotes displeasure. While many may be obvious, I think it is important to remember that the “pleasure” referred to at this time of the work, is far from that raised in 1924, after the formulations of Beyond the pleasure principle (1920g). The 1915 is still subsidiary of the “principle of constancy”, according to which the psychic apparatus would strive to keep as low as possible, or at least constant, the amount of excitement present in it. Then (ibid., P. 54) will name that "pleasure principle", now ascribed to the death instinct, as "Nirvana principle” (following the idea of Barbara Low) and a "new" pleasure principle, it will remain defined as the one that -pulsion of life through- makes the apparatus tend to the search for stimuli, according to rhythms, which redefine the same, as an object-seeking apparatus, instead of refractory as that of the Project (Cf., 1, p. 356) or of the Interpretation of Dreams (1900a) cited and commented above.

This implies the conception of a psychic narcissistic apparatus, refractory to the object as a provider of stimuli, [11,13] that allows us to understand the narcissistic base of melancholy: as I referred earlier, the lost object it is not such, at most it is a part of the self. In this way, I understand the “real affront or disappointment [...] on the part of the beloved person” (AE, 14, p. 246) as the injury provoked by the
discovery that the other is indeed that: another, an object, ‘not me’, ‘not like me’. It can be observed then that melancholy is triggered by the “appearance” of the object, rather than by its loss, which would be a loss of the self, I consider it one of the best examples of this “narcissistic functioning” of the psychic apparatus. In the same way as in mania, in which I and ideal are undifferentiated. The megalomaniac feeling would also be based on this narcissistic way, on the renunciation of the external object.

**Narcissism and death drive. Some conclusions and some “imperfections”**

Look, you can love me too,
I am so similar to the object.

S. Freud, (1923b), p. 298 (the translation is mine) [14].

Freud defines his Introduction to Narcissism as an “extension of the libido theory” (1914c, p.73). It is there that he raises the image of an original libidinal endowment of the self, later given to the objects that “however, considered in its background, it persists, and it is to the endowments of an object like the body of an amoeba to the pseudopods that it emits” (Ibid., Supra) Throughout this paper, I have been pointing out some knots that seem crucial to me from the Freudian point of view, not only of some theoretical controversies that have been raised since 1914, but with a striking validity, a hundred years later, in the current readings of the conditions of narcissism to understand and develop aspects of psychoanalytic theory and clinical, as well as to rethink the conditions of the concept of narcissism itself, imbricated with later Freudian conceptualizations, which allow to give it another dimension and potential volume.

The possibility of raising narcissism in relation to the death drive is not without the articulation of the superego. The epigraph of this last section introduces us to a theatrical scene to which Freud leads us to represent the inciting action of that instance that -as described by Angel and Betty Garma in 1966- invites us to abandon objects. Freud presents it as “the self” talking to the id. However, it would seem to be rather that other unfolded part of the self, which looks at it, criticizes and extorts it [9,15]. In 1923b, Freud considers that all the libido is accumulated in the id, and that it sends a part of it to “erotic endowments of object”, then, strengthened, seek to seize this libido of object and impose itself on the id as an object of love. It would be the superego, the ego ideal, “pure cultivation of death drive” and not a reservoir of libido that the ego was forced to resign. Melancholy, mania and paranoia amply show the model of partition of the self between one critical instance and the other, criticized. It is in this sense that I understand, following the ideas of Winocur, the very constitution of the psychic apparatus as “melancholy”, to the extent that this pathology shows, in a spectacular way, the way in which the apparatus is conformed, with an I that has been divided and sees itself criticizing itself and uttering attacks from this instance that Freud calls “superego”, which he locates as the “imperfection of our psychic apparatus” (1926d [1925], p. 146), which proposes the search for narcissism, as a deadly renunciation of objects. The work of analysis will have to be necessary to try to recover something more from that primitive state, in which libido in the ego and in the object are not differentiated, in order to try to be more independent of the ideal, of the superego and its deceptions [15-33].

**Conclusion**

(1) And the backwater answered: "But I loved Narciso because, when he lay on my banks he was inclined to look at me, in the mirror of his eyes, I saw my own reflected beauty (the translation is mine).

(2) In Latin, "It shakes - it flows - but it does not sink".

(3) St. John Chrysostom or John of Antioch (Antioch, Syria, 347 - September 14, 407) was a Christian religious patriarch of Constantinople, is considered by the Catholic Church one of the four great fathers of the Church of the East. In the Greek Orthodox Church he is considered one of the greatest theologians and one of the three pillars of the Church, together with Basil and Gregory. One hundred years after his death, John of Constantinople received the title by which he knows posterity: ‘John Chrysostom’, which comes from the Greek chrysostom (Chrysostom) and means ‘mouth of gold’ (chryssós, ‘gold’; stoma, ‘mouth’), since it would seem that it would have stood out as much for its capacity of preaching, as for its denunciations of the abuses of the imperial authorities.
This receives full development in the “G Manuscript” (p. 239 ff.) Quote Strachey at this point, that Freud frequently uses the term “melancholy” for cases in which modern psychiatry would speak of “depression”.

Strachey quotes about this, that this idea seems to have been expressed already in Studies on Hysteria (1895d): Freud describes a similar process in his discussion of the clinical history of Elisabeth von R. (AE, 2, pp. 175-6).

I always found this expression very interesting in Albrecht Dürer’s engraving of 1514, Melencolia I, in the expression of the main character.

The addition to Etcheverry’s translation is mine.

As Strachey points out, some years before this work “Grief and melancholy”, in 1910, Freud had declared in the debate on suicide, in the Psychoanalytic Society of Vienna (Cf. 1910g, in AE, 11, p 232) the importance of comparing and differentiating melancholy from the normal states of grief, saying that the psychological problem involved was still insoluble. Only with the concepts of “narcissism” and “ideal of the self” could he return to the subject.

Bibliography


